Santorum Froths
"This twenty-year old, inert sample of mustard gas is why the world must invade Iraq immediately."
"Congressman Hoekstra and I are here today to say that we have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, chemical weapons..." -- Sen. Frothy Mix
"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible Indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter" -- Reality
So unless he has better Iraqi intelligence than the President - and that is entirely possible - Mr. Santorum is once again talking out his ass. This has not kept the predictable Republican sources from rubber-stamping the Senator's remarks. Some points, however, remain underemphasized:
Offering the official administration response to FOX News, a senior Defense Department official pointed out that the chemical weapons were not in usable conditions...
... "This does not reflect a capacity that was built up after 1991," the official said, adding the munitions "are not the WMDs this country and the rest of the world believed Iraq had, and not the WMDs for which this country went to war."
posted by Management at 7:47 AM
4 Comments:
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Key Findings
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable:
* Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.
* The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or deployment of chemical weapons.
Iraq’sCW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.
* Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) financially unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray.
* Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after the departure of Husayn Kamil.
* Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and sparked a flow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry.
The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts.
* The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.
* Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.
* Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.
Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
* ISG did not discover chemical process or production units configured to produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.
* ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
* A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.
In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities, if required by the Regime.
* One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process plants.
Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have significantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization activities.
* ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is insufficient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities.
* Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for filling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities.
Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever included a trigger for CW use.
* Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confirm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
* Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. (See Annex A.)
* ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
* Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.
* The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
* The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.
* ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
Santorum: We Found the WMD
Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) took to the microphone today to announce a shocking discovery — that WMD have been found in Iraq:
Congressman Hoekstra and I are here today to say that we have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, chemical weapons. … Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent. Despite many efforts to locate and destroy Iraq’s pre-Gulf War chemical munitions, filled and unfilled pre-Gulf War chemical munitions are assessed to still exist.
The Bush administration commissioned the Iraq Survey Group to determine whether in fact any WMD existed in Iraq. After a year and half of meticulously combing through the country, here’s what the administration’s own inspectors reported:
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible Indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.
The White House should immediately announce whether it stands with Santorum or whether it stands behind the review conducted by Charles Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group. Recall, in October 2004, Bush said of Duelfer’s analysis:
The chief weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there.
Fox News isn’t waiting for an administration statement. Their right wing pundits are already peddling the story as truth. Host John Gibson: “Sen. Rick Santorum announcing a startling find … In fact, WMDs were found in Iraq.”
Transcript: Bush Responds to WMD Report
FDCH E-Media
Thursday, October 7, 2004; 2:02 PM
President Bush gives a statement to reporters on the findings issued yesterday by the Iraq Survey Group led by Charles A. Duelfer. Here is a transcript of Bush’s comments.
BUSH: The chief weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there.
The Duelfer report also raises important new information about Saddam Hussein's defiance of the world, and his intent and capability to develop weapons.
The Duelfer report showed that Saddam was systematically gaming the system, using the U.N. oil-for-food program to try to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions.
He was doing so with the intent of restarting his weapons program once the world looked away.
Based on all the information we have to date, I believe we were right to take action, and America is safer today with Saddam Hussein in prison. He retained the knowledge, the materials, the means and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction, and he could have passed that knowledge on to our terrorist enemies.
Saddam Hussein was a unique threata sworn enemy of our country, a state sponsor of terror, operating in the world's most volatile region.
BUSHIn the world after September the 11th, he was a threat we had to confront. And America and the world are safer for our actions.
The Duelfer report makes clear that much of the accumulated body of 12 years of our intelligence and that of our allies was wrong. And we must find out why and correct the flaws.
The Silberman-Robb commission is now at work to do just that. And its work is important and essential.
At a time of many threats in the world, the intelligence on which the president and members of Congress base their decisions must be better, and it will be.
I look forward to the Intelligence Reform Commission's recommendations, and we will act on them to improve our intelligence, especially our intelligence about weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you all very much.
END
Republican Congress members claim that evidence of Saddam's WMD have been identified
Michael Roston
Published: Wednesday June 21, 2006
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(UPDATE: Live on Fox News Senator Santorum is informed that a Defense Department official disavowed his conclusions. More at end of article)
Republican Congress members claimed late today that evidence of weapons of mass destruction hidden by Saddam Hussein had at last been identified in Iraq.
Speaking at a late afternoon press conference, Michigan Rep. Pete Hoekstra, Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, spoke with Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum. They claimed that 500 chemical weapons shells allegedly containing degraded sarin or mustard gas have been recovered by coalition forces since 2003, and that other filled and unfilled munitions have been found.
Santorum also attacked his "colleagues...on the other side of the aisle" for "repeatedly" claiming that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.
Rep. Hoekstra has called strongly for the release of a large cache of Arabic-language documents, believing that they would clarify the original case for war with Iraq. It is not known at this time if the information in any of the documents, available online at this Defense Department site led to the cache of alleged weapons of mass destruction.
This is not the first time that such chemical shells have been found in Iraq. Fox News announced in May 2004 that a sarin gas shell had been detonated near Fallujah, dispersing a small amount of agent. It was not evident that the insurgents using the shell understood what they were using.
The discovery of poorly accounted for stocks of WMD is not unheard of around the world. Researcher Jonathan Tucker detailed in 2001 for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists the discovery of a significant number of chemical weapons shells in Northwest DC.
Think Progress counters Santorum's announcement with the words of President Bush backing up reports by his own WMD inspectors which said that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction.
"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991," the Iraq Survey Group reported in 2004. "There are no credible Indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered."
"The chief weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there," said President Bush in October of 2004, as cited at Think Progress.
Santorum Blog, a "grassroots site dedicated to keeping Santorum supporters and political nerds up-to-date with the latest breaking Senate race news" unaffilliated with the Santorum for Senate campaign has a transcript of the press conference.
"I guess this debate hasn't yet ended," writes the site's editor.
A press release about the conference has been posted on Santorum's official Website.
"This is critically important information that the world community needs to know," reads a quote by Santorum above the press release.
Santorum's press release:
#
U.S. Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA), Chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, joined Congressman Peter Hoekstra, (R-MI-2), Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, today to make a major announcement regarding the release of newly declassified information that proves the existence of chemical munitions in Iraq since 2003. The information was released by the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, and contained an unclassified summary of analysis conducted by the National Ground Intelligence Center. In March, Senator Santorum began advocating for the release of these documents to the American public.
“The information released today proves that weapons of mass destruction are, in fact, in Iraq,” said Senator Santorum. “It is essential for the American people to understand that these weapons are in Iraq. I will continue to advocate for the complete declassification of this report so we can more fully understand the complete WMD picture inside Iraq.”
The following are the six key points contained in the unclassified overview:
• Since 2003 Coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent.
• Despite many efforts to locate and destroy Iraq’s pre-Gulf War chemical munitions, filled and unfilled pre-Gulf War chemical munitions are assessed to still exist.
• Pre-Gulf War Iraqi chemical weapons could be sold on the black market. Use of these weapons by terrorists or insurgent groups would have implications for Coalition forces in Iraq. The possibility of use outside Iraq cannot be ruled out.
• The most likely munitions remaining are sarin and mustard-filled projectiles.
• The purity of the agent inside the munitions depends on many factors, including the manufacturing process, potential additives, and environmental storage conditions. While agents degrade over time, chemical warfare agents remain hazardous and potentially lethal.
• It has been reported in open press that insurgents and Iraqi groups desire to acquire and use chemical weapons.
#
In an appearance later in the evening on Fox News, Santorum was told that an unnamed Defense Department official speaking for the Administration objected to his conclusions.
"Fox News’ Jim Angle contacted the Defense Department who quickly disavowed Santorum and Hoekstra’s claims," reports Think Progress. A Defense Department official told Angle flatly that the munitions hyped by Santorum and Hoekstra are 'not the WMD’s for which this country went to war.'"
"I’d like to know who that is," Santorum responded. "The fact of the matter is, I’ll wait and see what the actual Defense Department formally says or more important what the administration formally says."
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