When It Happens Again, Someone Will Say 'Noone Could Have Predicted'
And some weisenheimer will point out this:
New Orleans's levees do not meet the standards that the Federal Emergency Management Agency requires for its flood protection program, federal officials said yesterday — and they added that the problem would take as much as $6 billion to fix.
FEMA's managing to waste $1 billion and perhaps much more in New Orleans, costs have gone so far north that large areas are going to have to remain unprotected, and still key lessons have not been learned. A review panel of civil engineers is calling for a comprehensive re-examination of New Orleans's levy system, and the Army Corps of Engineers's procedures for assessment and improvements.
The review panel, which the Corps formed to analyze the work of its own investigation of the levee failures, was responding to a March 10 report by the investigators. The report found that the designers of the levees and floodwalls had not anticipated that floodwaters might push the floodwall away from the soil base, allowing water to course down into the gap and push the structure aside.
A 1988 report by the Corps showed that such a chain of events was possible. That and other studies, apparently, "never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system," the panel of engineers said.
The Corps investigators' report said a second factor in the 17th Street Canal failure was soft soils behind the levee that did not withstand the push from within the canal.
So just like last time - we saw it coming.
New Orleans's levees do not meet the standards that the Federal Emergency Management Agency requires for its flood protection program, federal officials said yesterday — and they added that the problem would take as much as $6 billion to fix.
FEMA's managing to waste $1 billion and perhaps much more in New Orleans, costs have gone so far north that large areas are going to have to remain unprotected, and still key lessons have not been learned. A review panel of civil engineers is calling for a comprehensive re-examination of New Orleans's levy system, and the Army Corps of Engineers's procedures for assessment and improvements.
The review panel, which the Corps formed to analyze the work of its own investigation of the levee failures, was responding to a March 10 report by the investigators. The report found that the designers of the levees and floodwalls had not anticipated that floodwaters might push the floodwall away from the soil base, allowing water to course down into the gap and push the structure aside.
A 1988 report by the Corps showed that such a chain of events was possible. That and other studies, apparently, "never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system," the panel of engineers said.
The Corps investigators' report said a second factor in the 17th Street Canal failure was soft soils behind the levee that did not withstand the push from within the canal.
So just like last time - we saw it coming.
Tags: Katrina
posted by Management at 9:26 PM
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The review panel, which the Corps formed to analyze the work of its own investigation of the levee failures, was responding to a March 10 report by the investigators. The report found that the designers of the levees and floodwalls had not anticipated that floodwaters might push the floodwall away from the soil base, allowing water to course down into the gap and push the structure aside.
A 1988 report by the Corps showed that such a chain of events was possible. That and other studies, apparently, "never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system," the panel of engineers said.
The Corps investigators' report said a second factor in the 17th Street Canal failure was soft soils behind the levee that did not withstand the push from within the canal.
March 26, 2006
Engineers' Panel Urges Study of All Levees in New Orleans
By JOHN SCHWARTZ
The safety of New Orleans's battered levees is "open to question" until the entire system can be analyzed in light of new information about how the 17th Street Canal levee failed after Hurricane Katrina, according to a review panel of civil engineers.
In a strongly worded letter sent Friday to Lt. Gen. Carl A. Strock, the chief engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers, the panel, from the American Society of Civil Engineers, said that "a determination of the overall safety of the hurricane protection system cannot be made until such time as the remainder of the system can be evaluated with the benefit of this new information."
The Corps has been racing to repair damaged sections of the levees by June 1, the start of the Atlantic hurricane season. The letter argues that regardless of the quality of those repairs, the parts of the system that survived the hurricane and were built to the old standard should be given a close look before the city can be declared safe.
The group found that the 17th Street Canal floodwall "appears to reflect an overall pattern of engineering judgment inconsistent with that required for critical structures."
The design, the letter said, did not include a margin of safety allowing for stresses beyond the expected: for example, I-shaped walls were used when an inverted-T shape would have provided greater strength.
The review panel, which the Corps formed to analyze the work of its own investigation of the levee failures, was responding to a March 10 report by the investigators. The report found that the designers of the levees and floodwalls had not anticipated that floodwaters might push the floodwall away from the soil base, allowing water to course down into the gap and push the structure aside.
A 1988 report by the Corps showed that such a chain of events was possible. That and other studies, apparently, "never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap would have on the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system," the panel of engineers said.
The Corps investigators' report said a second factor in the 17th Street Canal failure was soft soils behind the levee that did not withstand the push from within the canal.
All such soils should be tested and "all I-walls should be re-evaluated" immediately to see what stress they can withstand, the engineers' group said in its letter.
Ivor van Heerden, a leader of Team Louisiana, the group studying the levee failures for the state, said he was pleasantly surprised to see that the panel had reached similar findings. The fact that the groups the Corps formed to review its work have taken such a strong stand, he said, means "it's not just the crazy Cajuns with funny-sounding accents" criticizing the Corps.
A Corps spokesman, Paul Johnston, said that "in general, we agree" with the engineers' concerns, adding, "In fact, we're already implementing a lot of those recommendations."
The review panel's chairman, David E. Daniel, said in an interview that he was encouraged to see that the Corps accepted the conclusions. But, he said, "Simply restoring levees to pre-Katrina levels does not address the question of whether the design was adequate in the first place."
Dr. Daniel, who is also the president of the University of Texas at Dallas, also criticized the tendency of some Corps officials and public figures to proclaim the levees safe.
People deserve "the straight scoop on what the risks are, for those who do decide to return to New Orleans," Dr. Daniel said.
Waste in Katrina Response Is Cited
Housing Aid Called Inefficient in Audits
By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 14, 2006; A01
Nearly eight months after Hurricane Katrina triggered the nation's largest housing crisis since the Second World War, a hastily improvised $10 billion effort by the federal government has produced vast sums of waste and misspent funds, an array of government audits and outside analysts have concluded.
As the Federal Emergency Management Agency wraps up the initial phase of its temporary housing program -- ending reliance on cruise ships and hotels for people sent fleeing by the Aug. 29 storm -- the toll of false starts and missed opportunities appears likely to top $1 billion and perhaps much more, according to a series of after-action studies and Department of Homeland Security reports, including one due for release today.
The government's costliest initiative -- $6.4 billion allocated to place storm survivors in temporary trailers and mobile homes -- has ground to a halt around New Orleans this week, in part because of widespread racial and class tensions. Residents of surrounding localities have refused to accept the makeshift communities.
Only 71 percent of the 141,000 trailers that FEMA estimates are needed are being occupied.
Meanwhile, the trailer program consumes more than 60 percent of funds FEMA is spending on housing aid -- even though it benefits about 10 percent of the approximately 1 million households getting help, according to agency data and the Brookings Institution, which tracks recovery progress.
By contrast, a rental assistance program is serving 800,000 families, or 80 percent of households, at about one-third the total cost, or more than $3 billion. It was dramatically expanded four weeks after the storm -- a sluggish start, critics said -- after intense pressure from Congress and others who said the administration from the beginning should have taken advantage of such proven programs as low-income Section 8 rental vouchers.
In a recent White House report, Frances Fragos Townsend, President Bush's homeland security and counterterrorism adviser, reserved some of the toughest criticism for FEMA's mass trailer initiative. She said that it "foundered due to inadequate planning and poor coordination," and she recommended that the Department of Housing and Urban Development take over from Homeland Security in future disasters.
Citing lack of training, expertise and engagement with other agencies, Townsend's "Lessons Learned" report stated, "The Federal government's capability to provide housing solutions to the displaced Gulf Coast population has proved to be far too slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient."
FEMA officials say that they could have done better, but that Hurricane Katrina has displaced 1 million families outside their home Zip codes nearly eight months after the storm -- a far greater impact than other recent disasters.
Spokeswoman Natalie Rule said that although FEMA is learning from critical reports, "they do not capture everything that was done well and right." She added that "the innovative housing solutions put into place in the aftermath of Katrina will now become ready solutions we can offer in future catastrophes."
Still, the weight of judgments from White House, Congress and analysts is that the housing effort is a failure with many causes, including institutional neglect, lack of funding, and poor planning, decision making and execution.
Neither FEMA nor its predecessors had ever housed hundreds of thousands of disaster victims for a prolonged period, and the collapse of its initial trailer strategy is part of what Dennis S. Mileti, former director of the National Hazards Center in Colorado, called "the largest disaster-response failure in the history of our country."
Mileti said the United States should focus on helping storm evacuees start over wherever they are living. "You cannot build a temporary housing park for a million people," Mileti said. "If you did, you couldn't call it a trailer park. You'd need to call it a new city."
Arnold R. Hirsch, a University of New Orleans historian of race and housing, called the effort a "shuffleboard" policy "of ad hoc measures . . . susceptible to last-second changes and political influences." He added: "The primary lesson we may walk away from this incident would simply be the negative one -- of what not to do."
According to a 218-page audit by the Department of Homeland Security's inspector general that was obtained by The Washington Post in advance of its scheduled release today, FEMA cited a New Orleans hurricane as a top threat in 2001 but never completed plans because of a lack of funds.
Among other things, the report refers to rushed and inefficient decisions in the first weeks after Katrina:
· FEMA spent $900 million to buy 25,000 manufactured homes and 1,300 modular homes, most of which cannot be used because agency rules say they are too big or unsafe in flood zones.
· The agency spent $632 million to subsidize hotel rooms for tens of thousands of families at an average cost of $2,400 a month, three times what it later paid families to rent two-bedroom apartments.
· The agency spent $249 million to secure 8,136 cruise-ship cabins for six months, at a cost that Inspector General Richard L. Skinner estimated at $5,100 a month per passenger. That is six times the cost of renting two-bedroom apartments.
Skinner's report cites a "basic lack of understanding" of FEMA regulations for the $900 million manufactured- housing fiasco and a "fundamental lack of planning" for a makeshift program under which FEMA is reimbursing localities to lease 66,000 apartments for evacuees. It found the cruise ship program "not necessarily efficient."
Among 38 recommendations, the report calls for FEMA to provide "funding resources and institutional support" to complete catastrophic-disaster plans, develop alternative and long-term housing plans, and tighten contracting procedures.
On Tuesday, at the epicenter of the crisis, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin carried out an election-season threat and formally suspended development of new FEMA group trailer sites citywide. He asked the federal government to find alternatives.
FEMA officials privately complain that Nagin has failed to move on 108 approved sites. In a letter last week to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Nagin said FEMA has housed only 600 families on 84 approved sites, which could hold 4,200.
But the problem extends beyond the city. In Louisiana, only 32 of 64 parishes are accepting FEMA trailers, and about three-fourths of those parishes permit them only for their own residents, a FEMA spokesman said.
In Baton Rouge, whose population swelled 50 percent after the storm, the welcome mat is also gone. Mayor Melvin "Kip" Holden told reporters at a Feb. 13 Press Club gathering: "We have taken in more FEMA trailers than any county in the USA. We are out of the FEMA trailer business."
Although Baton Rouge is clearly straining from the burden of providing services to newcomers, people across the region say that social conflicts are feeding the hostility.
"It's the not-in-my-back-yard syndrome," said Jacqueline C. Jones, lead organizer for the Jeremiah Group, a New Orleans community group affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation.
At the same time, Jones said, evacuees are having second thoughts about moving into 28-foot trailers. She said they are concerned that another hurricane may strike and hope for more spacious FEMA apartments or modular housing.
Congressional impatience has mounted. Chairman Susan M. Collins (R-Maine) and ranking Democrat Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.) of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee wrote Chertoff last month, characterizing the government's "inability to help thousands of Americans who were forced from their homes" find housing "simply unacceptable," and called for improvements.
They were joined April 5 by the Senate Appropriations Committee, led by Chairman Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), which approved a $27 billion Katrina relief bill that would bar Chertoff from using housing funds until he submits a comprehensive plan. It also expressed continued frustration "with the lack of a housing policy for the Gulf Coast."
Amy Liu of the Brookings Institution said the administration underestimated the scope of the disaster and tried to manage it piecemeal. "They did not deploy all the resources they had," Liu said, referring to 12- or 18-month rental vouchers. "Everyone should have known from Day One that people didn't need two weeks' housing . . . or a month, or three months. It was crazy."
Levee Repair Costs Triple
New Orleans May Lack Full Protection
By Peter Whoriskey and Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, March 31, 2006; A01
The Bush administration said yesterday that the cost of rebuilding New Orleans's levees to federal standards has nearly tripled to $10 billion and that there may not be enough money to fully protect the entire region.
Donald E. Powell, the administration's rebuilding coordinator, said some areas may be left without the protection of levees strong enough to meet requirements of the national flood insurance program. Those areas probably would face enormous obstacles in attracting home buyers and investors willing to build there.
The news represents a shift for the administration; President Bush had pledged in the weeks after Hurricane Katrina to rebuild New Orleans "higher and better." Now, some areas may lose out as they compete for levee protection. Powell's announcement, in a conference call with reporters, prompted denunciations from state and local officials who said the federal government is reneging on promises to rebuild the entire region.
"This monumental miscalculation is an outrage," said Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco (D). "This means that, just two months before hurricane season, the Corps of Engineers informs us they cannot ensure even the minimum safety of southeastern Louisiana. This is totally unacceptable."
The change followed a surprise announcement from the Army Corps of Engineers that the levee reconstruction project, most recently estimated at $3.5 billion, would now cost $9.5 billion if insurance-certified levees were extended throughout the region.
Powell had said in December when the administration announced a $3.1 billion levee plan that Bush's commitment to rebuild the Gulf Coast "would be satisfied as it relates to the safety and security of the people." In February, after Congress approved $2 billion for the project, Bush said an additional $1.5 billion would be needed. The Senate will consider the request next week.
Yesterday, Powell acknowledged that now "we are faced with some new and tough policy decisions."
The news shattered the fragile relationship between Washington officials and Louisiana leaders, who have assumed that the rebuilding effort would cover the entire New Orleans area.
State and local leaders said the U.S. government had broken a trust and appeared to backing away from commitments to rebuild. Louisiana officials also questioned why federal engineers are just now announcing that the task would cost $6 billion more.
"Every time we turn around, there's a new obstacle," said Rep. Charlie Melancon (D-La.). "The estimates were done for rebuilding the levees, and a number was given to the administration and to the Congress. Now all of a sudden they say they made a $6 billion mistake?"
Melancon said he wondered whether the changes reflected the comments made by officials such as House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) after the storm questioning the wisdom of rebuilding the low-lying city.
"I have been concerned since November that people here in Washington didn't really want to help. . . . I think the people are starting to see where the problems are," Melancon said.
Sen. David Vitter (R-La.) said the announcement confirmed his warnings since November that Washington is "stonewalling" and seeking "way too little money" for levee repairs.
The new cost estimates, just as hurricane season is approaching, are "enormously frustrating," he said.
A spokesperson for New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin (D) said he had no comment.
In the conference call yesterday, Powell reiterated the promise that the levees will be at least as strong as they were designed to be before Hurricane Katrina hit on Aug. 29.
"If a hurricane such as Katrina hit the area, there would not be catastrophic flooding," he said. But, he said, there might be some "manageable" flooding.
Powell said that science, "not any bureaucracy, politics nor any member of the political branches," determined the cost revisions. Bush "is concerned with the well-being of the area's residents," he said, but "he wants to make sure we make the right rebuilding decisions, not just for the residents but for the American taxpayers."
Indicating that not all of the $6 billion will be forthcoming, Powell said he will be in discussions with state and local leaders about which portions of the region should be protected with insurance-certified levees, and also how much the state and local governments can pay.
"We're dialoguing with the state and local officials," he said, adding that if there is an agreement, maps clarifying where and how homeowners can rebuild could be released in 10 days. "We haven't decided what [amount] to ask for."
He played down the difference between the ordinary levees and those that meet the standards of the insurance program, saying the $6 billion in improvements is "an insurance issue, and not necessarily a safety issue."
Whether the levees meet the flood insurance standards is considered a key piece of the rebuilding puzzle, however.
In areas where the levees do not meet the standards, buildings may have to be constructed up to 20 to 35 feet above ground, a Powell aide acknowledged. Also, in a city where there is a desperate need for housing investors, areas with less-than-optimal levees could scare off flood-wary developers.
To help state and local officials choose which areas might be protected by insurance-certified levees, Powell broke the four-parish New Orleans region into 10 areas and listed the populations and cost of building such levees.
In the analysis, three Plaquemines Parish sections, southeast of the city, look ripe for cost-cutting. Less than 2 percent of the area's population lives there, but it would cost nearly $2.9 billion to build certified levees.
By contrast, protecting Algiers, where 13 percent of the region's population lives, would cost $129 million.
The reason the cost estimates have risen so dramatically is that the science of hurricanes and hurricane protection is evolving, Maj. Gen. Don T. Riley, director of civil works for the Army Corps of Engineers, said yesterday.
The loss of coastal wetlands protecting New Orleans from storms, as well as the lowering of the ground level in the area, have reduced the city's natural safeguards from flooding -- and altered assumptions.
Moreover, new storm data from the past 20 years suggest that powerful storms are more likely to hit New Orleans than previously believed. The previous levee design was meant for less powerful storms, but the recent surge of activity has changed ideas about what kinds of storms the city should be prepared for.
"As we learn, we will adjust our methodology and our estimates," Riley said. "To do it properly takes time."
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